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THE VALUE OF OBVIOUS EMPIRICAL RESULTS
AND THE OMNISCIENT
MR. PALANS: RESPONSE TO MR. PALANS'
COMMENTS
THEODORE EISENBERG*
Mr. Palans' comment raises one worthwhile question. Most of the rest
of his rant is either off the subject or too shallow to warrant extended
discussion.
The useful question Mr. Palans raises is whether this research is of value.
The article did not defend this mode of work; perhaps I am too immersed
in it to always keep in mind the merits of discussing the question. So let
me spell out its benefits here.
I. THE BENEFITS OF FINDING THE OBVIOUS
I will begin with what I take Mr. Palans to view as the worst case for
this research: all the results are obvious, everyone knew what the outcome
would be. In Mr. Palans' words: "The conclusion that judges' and lawyers'
views of a fee system are 'self-serving' and 'overstate the merits of
professional performance' is merely a statement of the obvious."'
Unless systems always behave the way we believe, there is value in
monitoring the way systems operate, even if they turn out to operate the
way we thought they did. A thoughtful bankruptcy practitioner should be
especially attuned to the need to check impressions against reality, because
so much recent bankruptcy work has shown widespread impressions to be
false.
Consider LoPucki and Whitford's findings about reorganizations of large,
publicly held corporations. They find, to my surprise, that most large
corporations successfully reorganize and that violations of absolute priority
are frequent but small.2 They and others find that managers and directors
* Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
1. Lloyd A. Palans, Comments on Eisenberg, Differing Perceptions of Attorney Fees in
Bankruptcy Cases, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 997 (1994).
2. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 125, 137-41 (1990). See also
Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority Claims, 27 J. FIN.
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of firms have short tenures in office.3 Since much of the concern about
Chapter 11 focuses on entrenched managers misbehaving, this last finding
is particularly important. Others find bankruptcy fees to be a surprisingly
low percentage of assets.4 Or consider the finding by Tagashira and me
(yes, Mr. Palans, I am citing myself again), that success rates well below
fifty percent could nevertheless yield a gain to creditors in reorganization
cases.
5
In the consumer area, Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook find that medical
debt is a surprisingly minor influence in consumer bankruptcy.6 Almost
half of the debtors reported no medical debt. Of those who reported
medical debt, the median debt was $616. Also surprising is the relatively
modest unemployment rate of bankruptcy filers. Between seven and
seventeen percent of filers were unemployed, and one could not reject the
hypothesis that unemployment among bankruptcy filers is no different than
unemployment in the population at large.7
The instant article is not on the same scale as the above works. The
other authors spent many years gathering and analyzing the empirical data
underlying their findings. But the spate of empirical surprises about
bankruptcy counsels humility about what we believe to be true. And if a
study simply confirms what we believe, it can serve a useful function.
Negative empirical results can be as important as positive ones.
This is not to say that we should all think up obvious studies to conduct
to confirm what we likely already know. Not all impressions are worth
confirming or refuting. This is a matter of judgment, not logic. The
American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI) conducted a useful study which asked
many appropriate, interesting questions about the bankruptcy fee system.'
Analyzing lawyer and judge responses separately, as the ABI did, is
ECON. 285, 286, 294 (1990).
3. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy of Large,
Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 723-42 (1993); Stuart C. Gilson, Bankruptcy,
Boards, Banks, and Blockholders, 27 J. FIN. 355 (1990); Stuart C. Gilson, Management Turnover and
Financial Stress, 25 J. FIN ECON. 241 (1989).
4. Theodore Eisenberg, Baseline Problems in Assessing Chapter 11, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 633,
649 (1993).
5. Theodore Eisenberg & Shoichi Tagashira, Should We Abolish Chapter 11? The Evidence from
Japan, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 111, 14146, 152 (1994).
6. TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER
CREDIT IN AMERICA 169 (1989).
7. Id. at 85-86.
8. AM. BANKR. INST., AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE NATIONAL REPORT ON PROFESSIONAL
COMPENSATION IN BANKRUPTCY CASES (G.R. Warner rep. 1991).
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obviously worthwhile in ascertaining how the system is functioning. Surely
there is also value in comparing their responses for the same purpose, as
well as for the purpose of enhancing our knowledge of the effect of human
self-perception on the litigation system.
II. THE OBVIOUS AND THE NOT-SO-OBVIOUS
Being human, I am of course not prepared to concede that the worst case
applies here. To Mr. Palans, the results were obvious because, to be paid,
lawyers must seek payment. He seems to be saying that lawyers systemati-
cally overstate their performance because they must affirmatively move for
compensation and others stand ready to oppose them. That may well
explain why a study of fee petitions filed in court would reveal inflated
claims, however troublesome that might be. But the ABI study did not
look at fee petitions. It asked lawyers how they behaved in a survey
setting that was nonadversarial. In responding to an anonymous survey, the
lawyers might be expected to be less advocates and more neutrally factual
in their responses. Many of our better lawyers can step back from an
advocate's stance.
Despite the nonlitigation setting, lawyers and judges differed in their
perceptions of mutually experienced events. How can it be that almost
three-quarters of the judges view themselves as usually ruling at the fee
hearing when less than half of the lawyers report that experience?9 Could
Mr. Palans really have known this before the study? I would have guessed
that perceptions of such mechanical aspects of the system would be less
divergent. Could Mr. Palans really have known of the widely divergent
judge and law2yer views about reimbursement of oversecured creditors, or
about their divergent views with respect to compliance with fee guidelines?
Could he really have known that these were national effects? His
experience would have to be unusually vast, because data like these, of
national scope, are beyond the experience of most individuals or firms.
Mr. Palans' reaction illustrates the need for the very kind of academic
research he disdains. Once aware of the outcome of a study, humans have
biased recollections about what they predicted before the study. This bias
leads people to report that they "knew it all along" when hindsight is what
9. Theodore Eisenberg, Differing Perceptions of Attorney Fees in Bantaruptcy Cases, 72 WASH.
U. L.Q. 979 (1994).
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really is at work."° I suspect that Mr. Palans' sweeping categorization of
the results as obvious is a classic example of "hindsight bias."
III. CONCLUSION
Mr. Palans' other comments suggest that he did not pay attention to my
talk or focus on the issues raised by the paper. I prefaced my remarks at
the Conference by stating that surveys of law professors or other academics
likely would reveal egocentric biases. Mr. Palans' ascription to me of a
holier-than-thou attitude (lawyers and judges have egocentric biases but we
wonderful professors do not) is a cheap shot.
In places, Mr. Palans' writes as if responding to a paper challenging the
level of bankruptcy fees. That was not my theme. The paper takes no
position on the proper level of fees. In fact, in other work I have been
rather protective of Chapter 11 and its costs." Mr. Palans might have
learned this had he read some of the sources he derides me for citing.
Mr. Palans' other comments are a combination of further irrelevancies
(How is the failure to cite cases in such an article a flaw? Does the three-
year-old status of the data really undermine my discussion?), inaccuracies
(I do not label anything a "negative perception" of the legal system; I do
not attack the system as inefficient), and poorly linked thoughts. I am
sorry that we could not have joined issue at a more worthwhile level.
10. See, e.g., Baruch Fischoff, Hindsight f Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on
Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION AND PERFORMANCE
288 (1975); Gordon Wood, The Knew-It-All-Along Effect, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM.
PERCEPTION AND PERFORMANCE 345 (1978); Mark R. Leary, Hindsight Bias and the 1980 Presidential
Election, 8 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 257, 257-63 (1982).
11. Eisenberg, supra note 4 (citing other studies); Eisenberg & Tagashira, supra note 5.
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